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Philosophy and Science: The Invention of Thought 
 
What the seventeenth century contributed to the problem of the relation of philosophy to 
science may be summed up in Descartes’s new concept of thought--a thought totally 
distinct from its cause yet existing in the mind. To Descartes, as too for Locke and Hume 
after him, human languages were conventional systems, governed by the Will.  But Ideas 
were independent of the Will and therefore the nearest thing to a universal Natural 
Language. These three philosophers believed that we do not think with Words, but with 
Ideas. Today, too, perceptual thought is considered to be distinct from its cause,  but 
some philosophers, like Wittgenstein in the early 20th century, for example, rejected the 
idea that perceptions exist in the mind.   
 
Locke, following on Descrates’s innovative use of the term idea, defined knowledge as 
the agreement or disagreement of ideas. To many of his readers, this definition seemed to 
deny knowledge its objective status because it equated knowledge with subjective Ideas. 
The philosophers of the seventeenth century, the century of the Scientific Revolution, 
launched the new concept of perceptual thought as caused perceptions.  That this was 
indeed a new concept may be seen in the objections voiced by the Dutch Jesuit Caterus, 
author of the first Objections to Descartes’ Meditations, who wrote: 
  
 2 
 
my question in this: what sort of cause does an idea need? Indeed, what is an 
idea? It is the thing that is thought of, insofar as it has objective being in the 
intellect. But what ‘is an objective being in the intellect’? According to what I 
was taught this is simply the determination of an act of the intellect by means of 
an object. (Philosophical Writings of Descartes, vol. 2 (1984), 66–67) 
 
To Caterus Ideas signified or denoted no-thing. 
 
Descartes’s answer to this objection was that an idea is indeed something, and not 
nothing, and hence it must have a cause. His answer indicated that he was dealing not 
only with a new concept of thought, but also with a new concept of knowledge and 
reality. The new concept of knowledge, as a collection or string of ideas, emphasized the 
mental nature of knowledge, and in maintaining the distinction between body and mind, 
this knowledge, according to Descartes, did not embody any material reality—it was 
simply a perception. 
 
This change in the concept of Thought led Hume, one hundred years after Descrates, to 
sum up the new philosophy as the Doctrine of Ideas, which stressed that knowledge as 
thought could not include in it any part of the known object. What for later philosophers 
was very perplexing  was the question how this concept of knowledge could result  from 
what we call the Scientific Revolution? in other words, could knowledge severed from the 
known be anything but subjective? Could it lay claim to any kind of objectivity? 
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Later philosophers concentrated their criticism on Cartesian epistemology,  the cause and 
theory of knowledge, and the question of clear and distinct ideas. However, Descartes 
and the British Empiricists could hardly be called epistemologists. They never asked the 
question, ‘do we know or not?’ As for Descartes’s skeptical gimmick—Cogito ergo sum-
- it was invented by him for the special purpose of softening the impact of the new 
concept of Thought as caused by matter,  
 
 whatever I have till now accepted as true I have accepted either from the senses or 
 through the senses. But from time to time I have found that the senses deceive, 
 and it is prudent never to trust completely those who have deceived us even 
 once. (Descartes Works, pp. 12).  
 
And it is in this context that we should understand the place of God in the Cartesian 
Meditations, a God who causes our ideas. Thus, even for Descartes, Thought was too 
sacred for it to be merely caused by matter. And it is here that we can assert that 
philosophy is, and always has been, a philosophy about Thought. For, how else can we 
interpret the fact that a philosopher like Descartes, whose speculations were wholly 
devoted to Science––to physics, optics and mathematics––has been read and is still being 
read as a philosopher of Mind?  
 
In order to stress the importance of the nature of thought in European philosophy we 
should remember that in the 18th century Berkeley adopted the Doctrine of Ideas in his 
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Theory of Knowledge, yet insisted that ideas are caused only by God. It is this aspect of 
Berkeley’s philosophy--the insistence on the divine cause of ideas and not on the  
non-existence of Matter--that was the main focus of his speculation. (Although, as we 
know, later generations tended to reduce his philosophy to its so-called immaterialism.) 
 
But this was not sufficient to secure the sacred status of Thought. Kant rejected any 
causal explanation of Thought, arguing that causality has nothing to do with Empiricism, 
but is a Transcendental (innate) Category of Thought, of how the Mind works. Limiting 
human understanding to phenomena, Kant makes Skepticism an inherent dimension of 
our knowledge: we can not know things in themselves. Furthermore, to think that we 
could prove the existence of God, as Descartes had thought, was simply inconceivable, a 
pure impossibility.  
 
Kant was so successful in making skepticism an inbuilt dimension of thought, that 
Russell, though rejecting the transcendental concept of causality and Kant’s notion of 
experience, continued to deplore the limitations of induction compared to deduction, 
seeing it as flaw in our capacity to think. Because for Russell Ideas were purely 
subjective, the only way of upholding Empiricism was to reject the whole 17th-century 
Doctrine of Ideas. This led Russell to initiate the Linguistic Turn in Philosophy whereby 
the philosopher no longer deals in Ideas but analyzes language in terms of meaning. He 
followed Frege in defining thought not as something in the mind but as a meaningful 
sentence or proposition.  
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For Wittgenstein, when he was writing the Tractatus in captivity, during the First World 
War, Frege’s translation of thought into a proposition was a neutral use of the concept of 
thought, which he adopted as synonymous to a proposition. He had no use for skeptical 
arguments in the Tractatus, because for him the Mind or Soul, and the meaning of life or 
Ethics, were beyond the scope of language. To him the belief in the causal nexus was no 
more than a superstition: the meaning of a proposition in not caused by perception but is 
a picture of reality.  
 
However, Wittgenstein’s Transcendental Mirror that allowed language to be a picture of 
reality was too reminiscent of the Cartesian Mind, and thus limited language to the 
positivistic knowledge of Facts. Naturally, the later Wittgenstein found that adopting 
Russell’s concept of meaning would indirectly lead him back to the problem of Thought: 
the correlation between an object and its name in Russell’s theory of meaning was, at the 
very least, problematic, because it turned linguistic analysis back to Ideas, precisely what 
the theory was supposed to resolve, undo, or overcome.  
 
Wittgenstein’s transition from the concept of meaning to the concept of use reveals the 
extent to which he was prepared to go to keep the sacred concept of thought 
unverbalisable in principle. I am alluding here to the Private Language Argument, the 
centerpiece of his Philosophical Investigations, in which Wittgenstein criticized the 
Cartesian Cogito or the notion of perceptual thought.  
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 In what sense are my sensations private?––Well, only I can know whether I am 
 really in pain––another person can only surmise it––in one way this is wrong and 
 in another nonsense… (Philosophical Investigation, Section 246). 
 
But what is surely the outcome of Wittgenstein’s successful rhetoric--a rhetoric invoking 
the function of language for inter-subjective communication--is that it points to the 
Cartesian Cogito as the cause of the breakdown of communication.  I call this “a piece of 
rhetoric” because it made the relinquishing of the use of the concept of Thought the sine 
qua non for continuing philosophical discourse. This injunction is reminiscent of the 
Jewish prohibition on uttering the Name of God. And this comparison is especially 
suggestive, given the similarity of aims of the Jewish theologians and of Wittgenstein in 
avoiding the sacrilege of uttering the Forbidden Name of God or of naming/defining 
Thought, respectively.  
 
However, if we are to return from the realm of thought to the realm of morals, we see that 
Wittgenstein has led his disciples into a blind alley. One of his distinguished disciples, J. 
L. Austin, at the end of his How to do things with Words, expressed his hope that among 
the various uses of language, the performative use of words might resolve the riddle of 
Ethics. For the general view at the time was that moral propositions are meaningless or 
merely emotive statements.  
 
This hope was translated in a variety of ways in numerous books, and authors like Martha 
Nussbaum and Cora Diamond, for example, tried their hand at reviving interest in moral 
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philosophy through the analysis of literary texts. This, surely, was  an interesting 
intellectual outcome of the Private Language argument.  I say “intellectual outcome” 
rather than “practical outcome” because of its barrenness in the sphere of morality. Ethics 
is not transcendental, as Wittgenstein would have it in the Tractatus. Ethics is the unsaid, 
tacit/silent dimension of how we live language as a story-telling activity. We live stories, 
narrative forms of life, by siding with good against evil. Good and evil are just the way 
we side with some characters against other characters in life as in fiction. Nevertheless, 
we cannot live with this hopelessly relativistic Ethics, which is why it is replaced by 
implicit or explicit legislations that impose leading stories as the Sacred source of 
morality––The Bible, the Koran, etc. These leading stories invoke transcendental or 
divine authority to justify their moral code and authority.  
 
In conclusion, we can say that, in one way or another, philosophers have always been 
involved with the problem of Thought and, as such, were intentionally or unintentionally 
opposed to the secularization of the concept of Thought. The ghost of Natural Religion 
(the explanation of religious faith by reason) still lives on in philosophy despite Hume, 
who, in his Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion, thought he was putting an end to it.   
 
I would like to offer my own concept of Thought: I am a Cartesian. I assume that the only 
thoughts we have are perceptual thoughts. Nevertheless, it is through Language, the 
means for creating our forms of life, that we live our stories as a free re-arrangement of 
the elements of perceptual thought. It is this imaginative creation of thoughts and their 
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circulation—the stories we tell––which is at the origin of our disagreements about 
thoughts, about ideas, about philosophy.  
 
Tracing here the changing status of the terms “idea” and “thought” from Descartes to 
Wittgenstein and his followers, has brought me to the realization that philosophical ethics 
is a branch of religion; it is not a meta-discourse but is on the same level and is thus 
continuous with the stories we live, and the stories we read and hear, in the course of our 
ordinary, daily lives. The insistence on the sacred origin of thought, whether in the case 
of Descartes or of Wittgenstein comes as a warning against the abuse of human 
knowledge: for the freedom to inquire is bound by an ethical imperative, or in the words 
of Genesis, book 3, verse 22: “And the Lord God said, Behold, the man is become as one 
of us, to know good and evil.” 
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